
POLICE AUXILIARY UNIT VOLUNTEER PROGRAM OF DAVAO CITY

POLICE OFFICE: MODEL PUBLIC SAFETY PLAN

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ABSTRACT

This study determined the situation of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) as basis for the reactivation of a Police Auxiliary Unit (PAU). Findings of which will guide the formulation of a model public safety plan. Validated survey questionnaires, personal interviews and documents were used in data gathering. Likewise, descriptive method using percentage and weighted mean were utilized in data analysis. The status of DCPO as described on its personnel deployment were as follows: intelligence operations were effective; visibility patrols were not effective; public safety/deployment support were not effective; traffic management were effective; search and rescue operations were effective; and security operations were not effective. In the administrative procedures governing the former PAU, the LGU of Davao City and DCPO were supportive to the PAU volunteers, but said unit has been disbanded later. It was concluded that the operational functions of DCPO on visibility patrols, public safety/deployment support and security control operations which were geared toward the maintenance of peace and order, and crime prevention programs, were “ineffective” and this could jeopardize the safety of the citizenry of Davao City. With this, it was recommended that DCPO should formulate a public safety plan on reorganizing an auxiliary unit as a force multiplier to assist them attain their mission on peace and order program, considering its depleted strength and their “ineffectiveness” in some operations; and Davao City LGU should extend technical and financial help to DCPO on the administrative requirements for the PAU recruitment citing DILG Memorandum Circular 2010-94, series of 2010.

KEYWORDS: *public safety plan, police auxiliary unit volunteer program, recruitment, Davao City, Philippines.*

INTRODUCTION

Peace and order, in every locality, always play a crucial role which contributes a giant leap on its economic growth, and even to the finite mind of every peace loving individual who wants to have tranquility in every inch of their life. Our fundamental laws even mandate the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all people of the blessings of democracy. (Philippine Constitution, 1987).

However, despite of the relentless efforts of the government to achieve a lasting peace in country, some quarters tend to disrupt the on-going peace talks. Thus, it was creating havoc and other forms of lawlessness. Even in Davao City, violence and crimes ranging from infraction of laws to felonies can be noted despite the presence of our peacekeeping forces, to mention are the organic Philippine National Police personnel of Davao City and the augmentation unit of Task Force Davao composed of military and para-military personnel.

Banfield (2009) said that a sustainable peace is much more than just an agreement, and peace also requires long-term dedication and commitment from authorities, both from the military and politicians, and the broad population alike. Various groups have also a role to play; the mass media, academics, citizen's organization, and the private sector. (International Alert, June, 2009).

The peace and order situation in the Philippines has often been characterized as inconstant and restless. The absence or lack of peace and order in the community is one of the reasons why the efforts of the government toward a more progressive and developed economy may be considered wanting. (CSC, 2004)

According to Davao City Police Office (DCPO), the crime volume in Davao City has increased for the CY 2013 as compared to CY 2012.

Davao City's crime statistics were as follows: Davao City Police Office recorded a 27% or 2,927 cases, increase in crime volume for the CY 2013 as compared to the previous year. A total of 10,880 crimes were recorded

for the year 2013, broken down as follows: index crimes – 5,760 while on non-index crimes – 5,120; and 7,953 crimes for CY 2012, broken down as follows: index crimes – 3,957 while on non-index crimes – 3,996. Index crimes composed of crimes against property and person, while non-index crimes are violations of special laws and city ordinances. Crime Solution Efficiency (CSE) registered at 32.97 per cent of the total index and non-index crimes, a decrease compared to last year's 43.60 per cent. While Crime Clearance Efficiency (CCE) registered at 37.15% for CY 2013. (DCPO, 2014).

In the delivery of police services to the people, the police to population ratio as required by law and an international standard is dependent on the state of peace and order, population density and actual demand of the service which shall be approximately one (1) policeman for every five hundred (500) inhabitants. While the minimum police to population ratio shall not be less than one (1) policeman for every one thousand (1,000) inhabitants, provided that urban areas shall have a higher minimum police to population ratio as may be prescribed by regulations. (RA No. 6975 as amended by RA No. 8551 and further amended by RA No 9708)

To date, Davao City's population is approximately 1,600,000, having an annual growth rate of 2.4% from 2010's population of 1,449,296 (NSO's 2010 census). Statistically, Davao City Police Office's strength is far beyond meeting the police to population's ratio of 1:500, considering that DCPO has a strength of 1,388 uniformed personnel, showing a 1 : 1,080 police to population ratio.

Challenged by the researcher's conscience to help Davao City, being a native of the place, I dreamt to have a sustainable peace and order, truly to be addressed as one of the livable cities in the world, the researcher conducted the study for the organization of a civilian volunteer group to be a partner of Davao City Police Office, capable of doing a job at par with the regular law enforcers in the maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of lives and properties. After knowing DCPO's inadequacies, organizing a police auxiliary unit as a model public safety plan will be recommended.


Statement of the Problem

This research study aimed to determine the status of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) as basis for the reorganization of a Police Auxiliary Unit (PAU) from Calendar Year 2012 to 2013 and to recommend measures through a model public safety plan that will augment/help the police force accomplish its mission.

Specifically, it sought to answer the following questions:

1. What is the status of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) in terms of the following operations:
 - 1:1 Intelligence operations
 - 1:2 Visibility Patrols
 - 1:3 Public Safety/Deployment Support
 - 1:4 Traffic Management
 - 1:5 Search & Rescue Operations
 - 1:6 Security Control Operations
2. How did the Local Government Unit (LGU) of Davao City implement the Police Auxiliary Unit (PAU) program, in terms of the following aspects:
 - 2:1 Recruitment
 - 2:2 Selection
 - 2:3 Employment/Deployment
 - 2:4 Training
 - 2:5 LGU Government Support
3. What are the anticipated problems on its administrative, operational, and augmentation aspects?
4. What measures through a model public safety plan can be recommended?

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK



Research Design

This study utilized the descriptive survey type of research which was directed to ascertain the prevailing conditions in order to reach a sound assessment of existing performance in the peace and order program of the Philippine National Police in Davao City.

Research Locale

The locale of the study was in Davao City, Island of Mindanao, Philippines. It comprises the following office: one (1) City Police Headquarters, twelve (12) Police Stations, one (1) Mobile Patrol Group, one (1) Public Safety Company and one (1) Traffic Group.

Research Respondent

The Personnel of Davao City Police Office were the primary respondents of the study. They were the City Director, Group Directors, Company Commander, Administrative Staffs, Police Station Chiefs, and Division/Section Chiefs. Included also were the Members of the Police Training Team, Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City, Peace and Order Council Members, Selected Barangay Captains and Selected Police Auxiliary Unit Volunteers (if any),

Table 1. Status of DCPO Personnel Deployment

Activity	Number of Assigned personnel	Effective		Not Effective		Description
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%	
Intelligence Operations	70	8	66.70	4	33.30%	Effective
Visibility Patrols	298	4	33.30%	8	66.70%	Not effective
Public Safety & Deployment Support	104	5	41.70%	7	58.30%	Not effective
Traffic Management	59	7	58.30%	5	41.70%	Effective
Search & Rescue Operations	115	7	58.30%	5	41.70%	Effective
Security Control	145	5	41.70%	7	58.30%	Not Effective

Table 2. Problems anticipated in the reorganization of Police Auxiliary Unit (PAU) (Multiple Response)

Anticipated Problems	Frequency	Rank
No/Lack of financial support/ legal assistance	154	1st
Lack of Benefits (Honoraria/Insurances)	151	2nd
Lack of Incentives (Uniform & other accessories)	148	3rd
Lack of Police personnel as PAU supervisors	135	4th
No proper training of PAU volunteers	128	5th
No/Lack of recognition for PAU's exemplary services rendered	122	6th
Inadequate Search & Rescue knowledge	116	7th
No proper selection of PAU Volunteer	113	8th
Inadequate educational background	111	9th
Political considerations in recruiting PAU volunteers	107	10th
Inadequate number of PAU volunteers recruited	103	11th
Inadequate intelligence/info gathering techniques	100	12th
Abusive PAU volunteers	91	13th
Lack of security/public safety measures/techniques	84	14th
Inability to solve traffic congestion	81	15th
Lack of contract signed by PAU volunteer	70	16th
Inadequate police visibility knowledge/techniques	68	17th

Findings

The status of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) in the deployment of its personnel as to operational functions, were as follows:

Intelligence Operations were effective. This signifies that majority of the Police Stations under Davao City Police Office have enough personnel assigned for the activity. Further, this implies that Davao City Police Office (DCPO) was receiving sufficient information for their intelligence operations relative to enemy activities or locations of criminals that led to their successful operations.

Visibility Patrols were not effective. This manifests that majority of the Police Stations under Davao City Police Office have shortage of personnel deployed for the activity. Further, this connotes that Davao City Police Office (DCPO) was not able to cover some areas while conducting visibility patrol due to limited personnel. Seemingly, the safety of the population were at stake as perpetrators could freely roam/hit the road in the absence of uniformed policemen performing preventive patrol.

Public Safety/Deployment Support were not effective. This indicates that majority of the Police Stations under Davao City Police Office have inadequate personnel committed for the activity. Further, the result suggests that Davao City Police Office (DCPO) can not provide the necessary technical support (like EOD/K9 Team, Hostage Negotiation Team, Emergency Response Team, SWAT Team), public safety and rapid deployment.

Traffic Management operations were effective. This implies that majority of the Police Stations under Davao City Police Office have enough personnel detailed for the activity. Further, the result connotes that Davao City Police Office (DCPO) was directing a smooth flow of traffic and implementing road safety nets for both users, the pedestrians and land transportation.

Search and Rescue operations were effective. This signifies that majority of the Police Stations under Davao City Police Office have enough personnel assigned for the purpose. Further, this suggests that Davao City Police Office (DCPO) had acted to any calamities accordingly and their timely deployment had saved people affected by such disasters.

Security operations were not effective. This connotes that majority of the Police Stations under Davao City Police Office have inadequate personnel detailed for the activity. Further, this signifies that Davao City Police Office (DCPO) was not able to provide the necessary security measures to some public engagements/gatherings like concerts, street parades, rallies, festivals and the like due to lack of personnel and the safety of the general public were endangered.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the status of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) as regards to the deployment of personnel on its operational functions was satisfactory. It can be gleaned that personnel deployment on the three (3) areas of its operational aspects like intelligence operations, traffic management, and search and rescue operations, were described as “effective”. However, on the other three (3) areas of its operational aspects such as: visibility patrols, public safety/deployment support and security control operations which are geared toward peace and order/crime prevention programs, the personnel deployment were found out to be “ineffective” and this operational status could jeopardize the safety of the citizenry of Davao City.

Such predicament of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) could be a basis for the reorganization of the Police Auxiliary Unit (PAU) that could augment the police force accomplish its mission in addressing violence and criminalities considering that the actual strength of Davao City Police Office (DCPO) was not enough to provide the necessary police services in serving and protecting the people of the locality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the findings and conclusion, this research study arrived to the following recommendations:

Davao City Police Office (DCPO) should formulate a public safety plan in accordance with the existing laws on organizing an auxiliary unit as a “force multiplier” to assist them attain their mission on peace and order/crime prevention programs, considering its depleted strength that resulted to its “ineffectiveness” in the deployment of its personnel on visibility patrols, public safety/deployment support and security control operations.

Local Government Unit (LGU) of Davao City should extend technical and financial support help to Davao City Police Office (DCPO) in its administrative requirements for the PAU organization like recruitment, selection, employment/deployment, training, and provision of benefits and incentives citing DILG Memorandum Circular 2010-94, series of 2010.

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